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Automation may dissolve the human freedom it promises to deliver

A study suggests total liberation from labour could trigger social transformations so extensive that modern concepts of liberty become unrecognizable.

16 statements added by Jan · 18 Nov see what was added
Automation may dissolve the human freedom it promises to deliver
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Published18 Nov 2026, 21:38 Last updated19 Nov 2026, 22:50 Sources
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For generations, utopian visions of the future have rested on a seductive mechanical promise. If machines could handle agricultural harvest, assembly lines, domestic maintenance, and administrative routines, humanity would finally escape the ancient burden of compulsory effort. In that envisioned world, freedom begins precisely where necessity ends. Yet the relationship between machinery and human autonomy contains an unresolved contradiction: the technical system required to eliminate compulsory tasks tends to reshape human social life in ways that transform the very meaning of freedom.

The dream of liberation from toil matters because it organizes contemporary debate around artificial intelligence, economic policy, and the future of work. When engineers and economists discuss the rapid advances in algorithmic coordination, they frequently appeal to a future where individuals spend their time on leisure, creative projects, and personal reflection. If this long-standing ideal cannot hold together logically, modern expectations about where technical development leads will need reassessment.

To see how the tension emerges, consider the simple sequence that connects technological development to human activity. First, an economy creates tools to reduce the physical effort needed to survive. Second, as these tools spread, society reorganizes its expectations around higher speeds, larger production volumes, and new standards of convenience. Third, meeting those rising standards requires further layers of coordination and mechanical oversight, pulling previously spontaneous activities into the sphere of automated systems. Rather than reaching a stable point where work stops and pure autonomy begins, the boundary between machine coordination and human life shifts outward.

A study by political theorist Jan Henrik Wasserziehr, titled “Can technical progress make us free? On the idea of freedom from labour,” argues that this dynamic pushes the vision of automated liberation toward an internal collapse.123 Published in the European Journal of Political Theory in July 2026, the 23-page paper examines how technological growth reshapes the fundamental categories through which people evaluate their own actions. Drawing on social theory, the philosophy of technology, and critical theory, the paper defends an incommensurability thesis: achieving absolute freedom from labor would require structural transformations that create a world unrecognizable under modern definitions of liberty.12

Why does technical liberation create a paradox?

Modern concepts of autonomy assume a subject who navigates real constraints, makes deliberate choices, and confronts physical necessity. The paper takes its departure from a remark in Hannah Arendt's 1958 book The Human Condition, exploring what occurs when technical instruments eliminate the basic frictions that defined historical human existence.12 In Arendt's historical critique, liberating humanity from labor inside a society that values nothing higher than consumption risks reducing citizens to passive participants in automated biological reproduction.

Jan Henrik Wasserziehr argues that the idea of freedom from labor contains an inherent tension.12 The realization of that ideal demands changes that culminate in a state incommensurable with contemporary society, meaning that inherited philosophical terms can no longer describe it.12 When machines absorb the friction of existence, the social structures that give personal autonomy its coherence are displaced.

Automation may dissolve the human freedom it promises to deliver
Source: CassandraPallas123 (CC BY-SA 4.0)

Addressing the intellectual lineage of this critique, Jan said in response to questions from Primary that modern machine coordination fits directly into earlier frameworks. Jan explained that contemporary automated decision systems operate inside a familiar historical trajectory: “Insofar as contemporary models of automated decision-making can be conceived within a broadly cybernetic paradigm--which is what Arendt was interested in--I don't think her analysis is substantially altered.” Jan added that the anxieties shared by earlier theorists persist: “The worries both Arendt and Habermas shared are worries that remain salient today: that predictive technologies render human agency obsolete. I don't think this fundamental point has changed.”

This continuity illuminates why contemporary observers struggle to perceive the underlying conflict. Jan told Primary that advocates of technological liberation frequently rely on an unexamined premise about human motivation. Jan said that “our desire for automation is not an anthropological fact but historically contingent--it results from specific socio-economic arrangements and conditions, in which many of our activities are not self-directed but imposed upon by structural necessity.” Jan noted that contemporary political philosophy often assumes “that our concepts of value are transhistorical--that being liberated from work equates to being liberated full stop.”

How does automation expand beyond the factory floor?

Technical development triggers a social dynamic that steadily raises the threshold of mechanical intervention required to exempt individuals from effort.12 In the paper's first analytical step, Jan Henrik Wasserziehr argues that this upward ratchet does not remain confined to production and industrial manufacturing.12 As industrial tasks become automated, secondary support activities, scheduling systems, and interpersonal services become reorganized around algorithmic efficiency to maintain operational harmony.

This continuous expansion plausibly reaches beyond the sphere of material production into daily routines, personal maintenance, and cognitive decision-making.12 Explaining this escalating spiral, Jan said in response to questions from Primary that the paper expects mechanical intervention to settle only after deep penetration into private experience: “The prediction the paper makes is not that this threshold will never stabilize, but rather that it will stabilize at a very high level.” Jan identified a structural timing problem in how modern automation unfolds: “in the process of developing systems to replace physical labour (highly intelligent and capable robots, say), we have factually begun automating certain cognitive and emotional activities that seem entirely orthogonal to the goal of automating production.”

This migration occurs because industrial imperatives colonize everyday habits. Jan told Primary that “the logic of production (essentially instrumental action structured around norms of efficiency) has spilt over into other domains of life (e.g., education, health, love, etc.), which now equally require mechanical inventions to meet new standards of productivity and speed.” The resulting cycle reconfigures standard requirements for ordinary living: “In other words, in the quest to automate physical labour, we have transformed the meaning of labour itself, which continiously raises the threshold for the technological capacity required to meet our increasingly expansive demand for automation (e.g., students now 'need' AI assistance to be successful in higher education, singles now 'need' matching algorithms to find partners).”

When asked whether an irreducible domain of experience might escape mechanical management, Jan offered a cautious boundary. Jan told Primary that “one would hope that meaningful human connections--friendship, family bonds, love, but also well-meant interactions with strangers--ultimately resist automation.”

Automation may dissolve the human freedom it promises to deliver
Source: Vecteezy

What remains of autonomy when necessity disappears?

The second stage of the argument contends that the complete mechanization of life leads the original concept of liberation to an absurd conclusion.12 Jan Henrik Wasserziehr argues that widespread automation would render modern concepts of freedom unintelligible.12 When every essential choice is mediated or preempted by automated apparatuses, human self-determination loses the practical resistance against which it was originally conceived and practiced.

Distinguishing this thesis from fatalism, Jan said that the philosophical framework remains open to unexpected futures. Jan told Primary that “unlike the fatalist rejection of such technology, the picture I offer is much more open-minded about it.” Jan stressed that the core premise points toward epistemic humility: “The idea of incommensurability precisely captures the idea that we are not well-placed to evaluate how a fully automated world would be experienced by the subjects inhabiting it.”

Jan suggested that human existence might possess inherent forms of friction that automation cannot dissolve. Jan noted that everyday development and interpersonal connection inherently demand sustained commitment: “It may be that human existence is as such and intrinsically 'laborious', that is, navigating the world simply requires effort and restraint.” Jan illustrated this with developmental milestones: “This is partially a developmental point: a toddler must learn how to walk and talk, a teenager how to become a functioning member of a community, etc. Such skill development may never be fully automated away and may always require effort.”

Jan extended this insight to communal obligations and moral limits. Jan told Primary that relational life is demanding: “It is also a social point: interacting with others--e.g. understanding them and building meaningful relationships--is cognitively and emotionally demanding and plausibly requires 'labour'.” Jan emphasized that ethical limits endure even in the absence of economic compulsion: “Finally, it is political: even in a world beyond work and necessity, what I can and cannot do may plausibly remain bound by the interests of others.” Jan concluded that modern liberty might survive if collective self-governance persists: “If we remain the social beings we are today, that is, beings whose existence is intrinsically structured by norms, there may be a place for distinctly modern conceptions of freedom even in a fully automated world. But this in part depends on the degree to which we retain meaningful control in devising the norms and standards we live by.”

This analysis is a conceptual critique within political theory, not an empirical forecast of specific unemployment statistics or industrial output figures. It relies on the interpretive frameworks of critical theory and the philosophy of technology, which means its validity turns on the logical coherence of its categories rather than on statistical measurements. The paper does not project a calendar date for full automation, nor does it quantify the exact pace of mechanical substitution across specific regional labor markets.

What the work provides instead is a cautionary perspective for discussions surrounding artificial intelligence and the post-work society. If absolute liberation through mechanical systems requires automating the very activities that cultivate critical judgment and ethical choice, the resulting social arrangement cannot be celebrated as human liberation in any traditional sense. Future inquiries will have to examine whether specific institutional boundaries can preserve personal autonomy without demanding that technology manage every dimension of social existence.

This piece was prepared from the paper in European Journal of Political Theory and public records together with answers from Jan to six questions from the Primary news team, completed September 2026.

The record

31 sentences trace to 3 sources and 1 contributor.

  1. 1 JH Jan Henrik Wasserziehr Document · Other sources · 27 Jul 2026 Can technical progress make us free? On the idea of freedom from labour Not published online
  2. 2 LS London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library Third-party reporting · ideas.repec.org · 27 Jul 2026 Can technical progress make us free? On the idea of freedom See the source
  3. 3 E econpapers.repec.org Third-party reporting · econpapers.repec.org EconPapers: Can technical progress make us free? On the idea of freedom from labour See the source
  4. 4 J Jan Contributor · interview 14 Sep 2026 · in the article since 18 Nov 2026 Contribution — Jan 16 statements added to this article

Article history

  1. Published 18 Nov 2026, 21:38
    Assembled by the Primary desk from 3 sources · 1 contributor · 31 cited sentences
  2. Jan, study by political theorist 16 statements added 66 days before publication
    1. Go to the sentence: Jan explained that contemporary automated decision systems operate inside a familiar historical trajectory: “Insofar as contemporary models of automated decision-making can be conceived within a broadly cybernetic paradigm--which is what Arendt was interested in--I don't think her analysis is substantially altered.”
    2. Go to the sentence: Jan added that the anxieties shared by earlier theorists persist: “The worries both Arendt and Habermas shared are worries that remain salient today: that predictive technologies render human agency obsolete. I don't think this fundamental point has changed.”
    3. Go to the sentence: Jan said that “our desire for automation is not an anthropological fact but historically contingent--it results from specific socio-economic arrangements and conditions, in which many of our activities are not self-directed but imposed upon by structural necessity.”
    4. Go to the sentence: Jan noted that contemporary political philosophy often assumes “that our concepts of value are transhistorical--that being liberated from work equates to being liberated full stop.”
    5. Go to the sentence: Explaining this escalating spiral, Jan said in response to questions from Primary that the paper expects mechanical intervention to settle only after deep penetration into private experience: “The prediction the paper makes is not that this threshold will never stabilize, but rather that it will stabilize at a very high level.”
    6. Go to the sentence: Jan identified a structural timing problem in how modern automation unfolds: “in the process of developing systems to replace physical labour (highly intelligent and capable robots, say), we have factually begun automating certain cognitive and emotional activities that seem entirely orthogonal to the goal of automating production.”
    7. Go to the sentence: Jan told Primary that “the logic of production (essentially instrumental action structured around norms of efficiency) has spilt over into other domains of life (e.g., education, health, love, etc.), which now equally require mechanical inventions to meet new standards of productivity and speed.”
    8. Go to the sentence: The resulting cycle reconfigures standard requirements for ordinary living: “In other words, in the quest to automate physical labour, we have transformed the meaning of labour itself, which continiously raises the threshold for the technological capacity required to meet our increasingly expansive demand for automation (e.g., students now 'need' AI assistance to be successful in higher education, singles now 'need' matching algorithms to find partners).”
    9. Go to the sentence: Jan told Primary that “one would hope that meaningful human connections--friendship, family bonds, love, but also well-meant interactions with strangers--ultimately resist automation.”
    10. Go to the sentence: Jan told Primary that “unlike the fatalist rejection of such technology, the picture I offer is much more open-minded about it.”
    11. Go to the sentence: Jan stressed that the core premise points toward epistemic humility: “The idea of incommensurability precisely captures the idea that we are not well-placed to evaluate how a fully automated world would be experienced by the subjects inhabiting it.”
    12. Go to the sentence: Jan noted that everyday development and interpersonal connection inherently demand sustained commitment: “It may be that human existence is as such and intrinsically 'laborious', that is, navigating the world simply requires effort and restraint.”
    13. Go to the sentence: Jan illustrated this with developmental milestones: “This is partially a developmental point: a toddler must learn how to walk and talk, a teenager how to become a functioning member of a community, etc. Such skill development may never be fully automated away and may always require effort.”
    14. Go to the sentence: Jan told Primary that relational life is demanding: “It is also a social point: interacting with others--e.g. understanding them and building meaningful relationships--is cognitively and emotionally demanding and plausibly requires 'labour'.”
    15. Go to the sentence: Jan emphasized that ethical limits endure even in the absence of economic compulsion: “Finally, it is political: even in a world beyond work and necessity, what I can and cannot do may plausibly remain bound by the interests of others.”
    16. Go to the sentence: Jan concluded that modern liberty might survive if collective self-governance persists: “If we remain the social beings we are today, that is, beings whose existence is intrinsically structured by norms, there may be a place for distinctly modern conceptions of freedom even in a fully automated world. But this in part depends on the degree to which we retain meaningful control in devising the norms and standards we live by.”